Acceptance approaches , which have been receiving increased attention within behavior therapy, seek to undermine the linkage between private events and overt behavior, rather than attempting to control the form or frequency of private events per se. Research comparing control versus acceptance strategies is limited. The present study examined the behavioral and subjective impact of a control-based versus acceptance rationale, using a cold pressor task. Subjects in the acceptance group demonstrated greater tolerance of pain compared to the controlbased and placebo groups. Only the control-based rationale targeted the subjective experience of pain but it did not differ across rationales. Results confirmed that acceptance was effective in manipulating the believability of reason giving, a key process measure. By encouraging individuals to distance themselves from their private events, acceptance methods may help reduce the use of emotional reasons to explain behavior and hence shift concern from moderating thoughts and fee lings to experiencing the consequences of one's action. Acceptance is a promising new technique. Its effect is all the more surprising given that it teaches principles (e.g., "thoughts do not cause behavior") that run counter both to the popular culture and to the dominant approaches within empirical clinical intervention.
Most forms of behavior therapy are based on the view that control of the form, frequency, or situational sensitivity of maladaptive private events usually need to change in order for important therapeutic improvements to be seen. It is not by accident that many disorders (thought disorders, anxiety disorders, affective disorders, and so on) and many treatments for these disorders (anxiety management, thought stopping) are described in these terms.
Many well-known behavior therapies can be conceptualized as controlbased interventions in this sense. Relaxation (Bernstein & Borkovec, 1973) and cognitive restructuring (Flor & Turk, 1988) are two ready examples. The usual goal in relaxation is to train an incompatible response to muscle tension or anxiety, which can replace, reduce, or otherwise control the undesirable response. In cognitive restructuring the therapist focuses on identifying maladaptive evaluations and expectations and replacing these with more useful conceptualizations. What is common to both is the view that an underlying, private event needs to be regulated before clinical improvement can occur or be maintained.
An alternative approach has recently received attention: psychological acceptance (Hayes, Jacobson, Follette, & Dougher, 1994; Hayes et aI. , 1996) . Etymologically, "acceptance" derives from a word meaning "to take or receive what is offered." Psychologically, acceptance connotes an active process of taking in an event or situation. In a therapeutic context, some degree of acceptance is always present, as the client and therapist must minimally "take in" that a problem exists in order to work on it (Linehan , 1994) . At a higher level , acceptance approaches attempt to teach clients to feel emotions and bodily sensations more fully and without avoidance, and to notice fully the presence of thoughts without following , resist ing, believing , or disbelieving them. Another way to say this is that acceptance seeks to alter the function of private events, rather than primarily their form and frequency. The relevant question is no longer "how do we change undesirable thoughts and feelings" but "what context produces the most useful thought-behavior or emotion-behavior relationship?"
There are some differences among researchers in thei r use of "acceptance." For example, Jacobson and colleagues use the term primarily as a social term to refer to the abandonment of efforts by one partner to change the behaviors of another in certain key areas (e.g., Jacobson & Christensen, 1996) . Our use of psychological "acceptance" applies to the world of private experience, not specific overt behaviors or situations in the physical world . Psychological acceptance also does not refer to toleration, which is the "acceptance" of an event in the effort to control it or minimize it. Instead, acceptance refers to the willingness to remain in contact with and to actively experience particular private experiences (e.g., bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, behavioral predispositions) that seem to accompany functionally useful overt behaviors. Although the content of acceptance-based treatments vary (see Hayes et aI. , 1994) , most directly or indi rectly target the dominance of language over other psychological events by utilizing such methods as paradox and metaphor, "here and now" experiential and mindfulness exercises, meditation, and so on .
As an example of an application of psychological acceptance, consider substance abuse disorders. The overuse of substances is generally conceptualized as an attempt to moderate certain emotions or bodily states that have been evaluated as aversive. Control-based therapies may attempt to reduce undesirable emotions, cravings, and cognitive appraisals directly. In an acceptance-based approach, however, the user's intention to control emotions, thoughts, cravings, or bodily states is itself targeted for change. Clients are taught to think thoughts as (mere) thoughts, and to make overt behavioral choices that are congruent with valued life changes, rather than using drugs as a means of avoiding private experience.
A growing body of data suggests the importance of psychological acceptance across a wide clinical range, including chronic pain (Geiser, 1992; Kabat-Zinn, 1991) , affective disorders (Zettle & Rains, 1989) , anxiety disorders (Hayes, Afari, McCurry, & Wilson, 1990) , emotional distress of families with severely physically handicapped children (Biglan, 1990) , borderline personality disorder (Shearin & Linehan, 1992) , and dysfunctional couples (Jacobson, 1992) . Acceptance-based models are implicit in some of the less empirical traditions, such as the humanistic or experiential approaches (Greenberg, 1994) , and only more recently have been embraced by cognitive behavior therapists (Hayes et aI., 1994; Jacobson, 1992; Shearin & Linehan, 1992) . However, there are presently very few data specifically comparing acceptance and control approaches. Several researchers have compared approaches that have included acceptance and control components in mUlti-component packages (e.g., Barlow & Craske, 1989; Cordova & Kohlenberg, 1994; Dougher & Hackbert, 1994; Koener, Jacobson, & Christensen, 1994; Linehan, 1994; Marlatt, 1994) , but these studies were not conducted in a manner to isolate the relative impact of the components.
Ultimately the precise role of acceptance versus control-oriented approaches could be addressed using a randomized clinical trial, but doing so would require that researchers refine their actual interventions to focus on these two alternative approaches more precisely. A more readily available place to begin is to examine the impact of acceptance and control strategies on laboratory tasks.
The present study uses this approach to study the impact of the two different treatment rationales on laboratory pain. Rationales were chosen as the intervention because they are necessary components of psychotherapy that can be highly refined and targeted in a laboratory setting. Virtually all variants of psychotherapy seek to present an explanation of the nature, etiology, or treatment of the relevant psychological phenomena at hand. Laboratory pain (in this case using a cold pressor, Hines & Brown, 1932) is useful not just because it has served as an effective analogue for acute clinical pain (Shumate & Worthington, 1987) but also because pain has both private and overt behavioral components that are well correlated in normative views of pain. Acceptance interventions focus on detaching private events from the control of behavior, whereas control-based strategies focus on private change as a means to produce overt change. Thus, it might be expected that an acceptance rationale for a laboratory pain task would have a significantly greater impact on tolerance to pain (minutes under water) than a control-based rationale, because acceptance directly targets behavioral change. Conversely, a control-based rationale should demonstrate a greater effect on the subjective evaluations of sensation , pain, and unpleasantness than acceptance, because a control-based rationale targets thoughts and feelings. These predictions were examined in the present study.
METHOD

Study Design
Subjects were prescreened for eligibility, given two trials of the cold pressor task separated by an intervention, and assessed preintervention and postintervention. Dependent variables included tolerance to pain and self-reports of felt pain , unpleasantness, and sensation . Process measures and checks on treatment quality integrity included believability of reason giving and subject evaluations of the value and usefulness of the rationales. The independent variable was the rationale used for the task: acceptance-based versus a control-based as compared to an attention placebo.
Subjects
Subjects were university students who received extra credit for participation.
Measures
Manipulation Checks
Believability of reason giving. The purpose of this measure was to assess the degree to which subjects believed verbal formations of causes and effects in scenarios that implicated a causal role for private events. Subjects read two brief scenarios, one involving a male and one a female. For example: "Every time Mike sits down to take a test, he starts to feel pain in his head. When this happens, Mike usually excuses himself from the test and reschedules it. Please list at least five reasons that Mike might be likely to give for leaving the test:' Subjects were then asked to list two reasons they would give if they were the person in the scenario. Subjects were then asked to go back and rate each list-the five reasons the person in the scenario might give and the two of their own, in terms of how good (reasonable, valid) the reason was. The scale ranged from "1" to "9," with "1" being "bad" and "9" being "good." The believability of reason giving score was the summation of the seven ratings for each of the two scenarios.
Value and usefulness. As a check on the possibility that the treatment conditions generated different demand characteristics, two ratings of subject evaluation of the training were obtained-value and usefulness. After the intervention and the second cold pressor task, subjects were asked: "How valuable was the training to you in handling the tolerance test after training? When you had gone through the training, but before you had done the tolerance test, how useful did you think the training would be? That is, how much did you believe that it would help you?" Subjects responded to each by drawing a vertical line through a 4" horizontal line, scaled from "not at all" ("0") at the left to "very much" ("100") at the right.
Objective Measure
The length of time under water (tolerance to pain) provided an objective measure of the effectiveness of the intervention. For safety reasons subjects were not allowed to exceed 300 seconds of exposure to the cold water.
Subjective Measures
Subjective measures were provided by subject self-report of felt pain, unpleasantness, and sensation associated with the cold pressor task. This three-part assessment was based on Melzack and Wall (1965) . Pain is the intensity and unpleasantness the degree of adversity of the experience. Sensation is the total amount of sensation the subject perceives (not just painful sensations). Each dimension was rated by the subject drawing a vertical line through a 4" horizontal line, scaled from "none at all" ("0") at the left to "extremely intense" or "extremely painful" or ''very unpleasant" ("100") at the right.
Secondary Measures
Subjects completed the Cognitive Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire (CSAQ; Schwartz, Davidson, & Goleman, 1978) and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) , which were selected because of their hypothesized sensitivity to the interventions and intended to be used, if necessary, for appropriate statistical adjustments. The CSAQ measures cognitive and somatic aspects of anxiety. It is considered to be a trait measure of anxiety in that it taps relatively enduring patterns. The STAI measures both state and trait anxiety; however, only the items measuring state anxiety were utilized in this study.
Therapists
Four male therapists were counterbalanced across conditions.
Therapists were similar in background, academic history, and clinical experience. Audiotape checks were done on the independent variable to ensure integrity of treatment. Two blind raters sorted each session tape Into the three intervention categories to make sure that the protocol was followed.
Interventions
Each "rationale" lasted approximately 90 minutes. With the exception of subject interaction and questions, the rationales were scripted, word for word. We term these interventions "rationales" because they presented a kind of mini-theory about pain, provided examples and brief exercises, and suggested that the cold pressor task be approached in a particular manner, much as clinical interventions present rationales for a clinical treatment program before therapy per se begins.
Acceptance-based rationale. This rationale attempted to disconnect automatic thoughts and feelings (such as the thought "I can't stand this pain") from behavioral actions. People in this group were asked to sit back and to notice their thoughts and feelings, but not to allow them to control their actions. Subjects were told that the intent was to help people accept their feelings and not to let their feelings run their lives.
The acceptance rationale also included the following principles: (1) It is often impossible to get rid of "bad" feelings and thoughts by directly trying to do so (e.g., "don't think of the pain" may cause thoughts of pain). (2) Thoughts and feelings are often viewed as reasons for behavior (e.g., "I couldn't do 'x' because of the pain."), but they neither cause nor justify behavior. (3) We don't really know much of why we do things, but we can often know what works and what needs to be done. (4) Thoughts and feelings are not the same as "who we are." The acceptance rationale thus had four major goals: Undermine automatic rule following. Undermine the attachment to and identification with particular thoughts and feelings. Clarify how the client's current agenda is a byproduct of our natural system of language, and can be unworkable. Have the client make and complete a behavioral commitment that is not linked to changes in private events.
Control-based rationale. This rationale was drawn from a coping skills and stress inoculation approach to pain (Turk, 1978) and attempted to link various private actions to the control and modification of pain. Subjects were told that various techniques could help modify and regulate the pain, including positive self-talk, controlled breathing, positive imagery, and body focusing. The intent was to help people control their thoughts and feelings so that they would not have to feel as much discomfort. For example, the subjects were told 'What I want you to do now is to think of some pleasant scene from your past and to describe it in vivid detail. I'll then help you imagine or relive the scene so you can focus on it later when you are confronted with a noxious stimulus:'
Attention placebo rationale. This rationale served to focus subject attention to the phenomenon of pain. Subjects received educational presentations on the types and components of pain, as well as chronic pain from a behavioral perspective (i.e., emphasizing the direct and indirect reinforcement of pain). Subjects also reviewed in detail their prior pain experiences and how they had coped with them.
Procedure
Prescreening. Subjects were prescreened to make sure they had no problems that would preclude exposure to cold water (e.g., Reynaud's Disease, recent injuries). Subjects then completed the Believability of Reason Giving and eSAQ and were assigned to an intervention by the roll of a die.
First cold pressor task. The STAI was administered immediately prior to beginning the cold pressor task. To assess tolerance and experience of pain, subjects were instructed to place their nondominant hand in a noncirculating slurry of ice water (1°e, 33 OF), and then to rate this experience every 60 s and when they took their hand out on three dimensions-sensation, unpleasantness, and pain. Although subjects were instructed that they were free to terminate exposure at any time, to increase demand they were told to keep their hand immersed for as long as possible.
To avoid inadvertent experimenter contamination, there was no overlapping of staff between the preintervention, intervention, and postintervention phases. Subjects were informed that the experimenter did not know the intervention to which the subjects had been assigned, nor their prior assessment results.
Subjects who were able to keep their hand in the ice water for 5 minutes during the first cold-pressor task were excused from further participation in the study. This was done to increase the power of the experimental intervention, which was meant for individuals who were unable to tolerate pain readily, and to avoid excessive exposure to the cold water. This high-demand pretest eliminated 58% of the subjects.
Intervention. Subjects were run in several waves of 90-minute-long small groups (3-4 per group) within each treatment condition. The training interventions were regulated by adherence to a written script for each treatment. Each condition contained approximately the same number of subjects (8 acceptance, 13 control-based, and 11 placebo) ",varying slightly according to the outcome of the initial rolling of the die for ' condition assignment.
Second cold pressor task. Subjects completed the Believability of Reason Giving and then participated in a second cold pressor task that was procedurally identical to the first. Following the cold pressor, subjects completed the Value and Usefulness measures and were debriefed.
RESULTS
Prior to analysis, all variables were examined for accuracy of data entry, missing values, and fit between their distributions and the assumptions of multivariate analysis. One subject had missing data for the postintervention measure of believability of reasons. Data for this subject were eliminated in subsequent analyses of believability of reasons. Two other subjects were missing one or more rating scores for one of the believability scenarios. Average scores were calculated from the subjects' ratings of the other scenario, and substituted for the missing ratings. The baseline measures of pain, sensation, and unpleasantness were highly correlated with each other, as were the three postintervention subjective measures highly correlated with each other. Consequently, the subjective measures of pain, sensation , and unpleasantness were aggregated and averaged in each of the phases. The dependent variables, value and usefulness of the intervention, were also highly correlated; value was therefore dropped as a variable. The somatic anxiety subscale of the CSAQ was deleted because it correlated highly with other secondary measures. Separate analyses were then performed for initial group differences, the manipulation checks, and the objective and subjective measures.
Initial Group Differences
One-factor ANOVAS on the pretest scores indicated that the groups differed significantly on the preintervention aggregate variable of pain/unpleasantness/sensation [F(2, 28) = 3.405, p = .031]. However, the use of this variable as a covariate in subsequent analyses effectively adjusted for this initial group difference. There were no other group differences across the preintervention measures. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of pretest and posttest raw scores. ANOVAs were utilized to examine group differences on the secondary measures and demographic characteristics. None were found. Because there were no group differences on the secondary measures and they were not significantly correlated with the dependent variables, the secondary measures were not used as covariates in the subsequent analyses. To check for a differential effect of therapists across conditions, four separate 3 x 4 ANOVAs-one for each dependent variable-were conducted using therapist and treatment condition as the independent variables. There were no significant group by therapist effects.
Manipulation Checks
An analysis of covariance was performed on believability of reason giving. The independent variable was treatment condition; the covariate was the baseline measure of believability of reason giving which was significantly associated with postintervention believability scores, F(1, 27) = 28.12, p = .000. Believability of reason giving varied significantly with treatment condition, with F(2, 27) = 4.103, P = .028. The strength of the relationship between adjusted believability of reason giving and treatment condition was moderate (.21). The adjusted marginal means, as displayed in Table 2 , indicate that the least believability was obtained from subjects in the acceptance condition, and the greatest was obtained from subjects in the control-based condition. The acceptance rationale explicitly targeted the believability of reasons, whereas the control-based rationale did not. These data confirm that acceptance was effective in manipulating this key process measure.
To determine if any group differences could possibly be attributed to differential demand characteristics inherent in the treatment conditions, an ANOVA was performed on usefulness of the intervention. The independent variable was treatment condition. Subject evaluation of the interventions did not significantly vary with treatment condition, with F(2, 29) = 1.49, P = .241 , showing that the experimental personnel did not bias subjects' evaluation of the interventions. 
Objective Measure
An analysis of covariance was performed on pain tolerance (time under water). The independent variable was treatment condition. The covariate was the preintervention measure of time under water, which was significantly associated with postintervention time under water, F(1 , 28) = 28.04, P = .000. After adjustment by the covariate, time under water varied significantly with treatment condition, F(2 , 28) = 3.34, P = .05. The strength of this relationship was moderate (.19 ) . The adjusted marginal means, as displayed in Figure 1 and Table 2 , indicate that the greatest time under water was obtained by subjects in the acceptance condition , with the least obtained by subjects in the placebo . The better performance of the acceptance group compared to the control rationale group was consistent with the difference in focus between the two rationales. Acceptance explicitly targeted behavior, but the control rationale did not.
Subjective Measures
An analysis of covariance was performed on the average of the three postintervention subjective measures (pain, sensation, unpleasantness). The independent variable was treatment condition. The covariate was the preintervention average of the three measures, which was not significantly associated with the postintervention average of the measures, F(1 , 28) = 1 .52, P = .228. The postintervention aggregate of the subjective measures did not significantly vary with treatment condition, with F(2 , 28) = .08, p = .926. This was an unexpected result, in view of the fact that the control rationale specifically targeted these variables whereas the acceptance and placebo rationales did not.
DISCUSSION
This study shows that a rationale that undermines private events as fundamental determinants of behavior can have a greater impact on overt forms of pain behavior than a rationale that attempts to change the form and frequency of thoughts and feelings as precursors to behavioral change. In addition, this study shows that the subjective experience of pain did not differ across rationales, despite the fact that only the controlbased rationale targeted this variable. Lastly, results confirmed that acceptance was effective in manipulating the believability of reason giving, a key process measure.
Conceptual Issues
Control-based interventions (e.g., Turk, Meichenbaum, & Genest, 1983; Philips, 1987; Sternbach, 1987) are based on the view that private events are causally related to dysfunctional behavior. Consequently, direct efforts to change the form, frequency, or situational sensitivity of maladaptive thoughts are believed to be necessary to produce therapeutic improvement.
The notion of the need for control in the area of private events may be culturally supported based on two major themes: (a) Many explanations for overt behavior are based on the causal efficacy of an inner world, and (b) deliberate control often works when applied to the physical world. There is some evidence, however, that control strategies are often not effective when applied to thoughts, emotions, and sensations. For example, attempts to suppress thoughts are often followed by a rebound effect of increased thinking of those very thoughts (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987; see Hayes et aI., 1996 for a review) .
It is in the interests of the wider culture to reinforce the construction of causal rationales, or reason giving. Reasons serve as a measure of an individual's intention, strength of motivation, or construction of behavioral relationships. The use of emotional or cognitive "causes" may also serve as a cultural substitute for more idiosyncratic histories. For example, it may be easier to teach a child about what to do when "hungry" as opposed to what to do when food deprived, or presented with preferred food, or any of the many other environmental sources over a state of reinforceability with regard to food. This may be why reasons for overt behavior that describe private events (e.g. , "because I was angry") are widely validated by the larger culture. Control-based rationales reflect this dominant cultural paradigm and, therefore, accept the identification of private events as providing a sufficient explanation of behavior. Perhaps for that reason, control-based rationales seem to dominate most forms of psychotherapy.
The present finding of group differences in the believability of reasons suggests that the mechanism of change for acceptance differs from the control-based rationale, a finding that has been observed in other studies of interventions linked to these rationales (Zettle & Rains, 1989 ). By encouraging individuals to distance themselves from their private events, acceptance methods may help reduce the use of reasons to explain behavior and hence shift concern from moderating thoughts and feelings to experiencing the consequences of one's action. Acceptance shifts the agenda from feeling good to feeling good. Acceptance-oriented rationales provide distinct alternative approaches that may be especially useful when control-oriented treatments have failed. An acceptance approach may also be more effective among individuals who demonstrate high experiential avoidance, a hypothesis that we are currently studying among a population of polysubstance abusers on methadone maintenance.
There is no direct evidence in the present study that the actual functions of private events changed through the acceptance intervention. Clearly, the functions of the cold water did change. The fact, however, that tolerance went up most in the acceptance group but pain did not go down most in that group suggests that the synchrony between feelings and overt behavior was influenced by the acceptance rationale.
This study has several limitations. It is possible that subjects utilized their own strategies for coping with pain during the cold pressor tasks, as previously confirmed in other studies (Holroyd & Andrasik, 1978; Tan, 1980; Tan & Poser, 1982) . Future research should, therefore, explicitly assess for this, either by utilizing a talk-aloud procedure or a pencil and paper assessment. The ceiling of 5 minutes in the cold pressor task prevented some subjects from reaching their limit of pain tolerance; consequently, group differences on this variable are likely to be even greater than those obtained. Another limitation is that the nonsignificant results obtained in certain areas may have been caused by inadequate power. Lastly, a laboratory task such as this provides relatively limited information about what might happen in more clinically relevant situations. Nevertheless, the present study does show that acceptance rationales can produce notable changes in behavior, and it supports the need to compare acceptance and control-based interventions in more clinically relevant preparations.
Acceptance Applied to Pain
In many instances of acute pain, control methods, such as medication, bed rest, avoidance of activities, distraction, and so on prove to be efficacious. However, because chronic pain is perceived as largely uncontrollable (Arntz & Schmidt, 1989) , the application of control methods may result in a prolonged but unsuccessful struggle to control pain . It is just such a context in which an acceptance strategy might prove particularly effective.
The pain literature suggests that attempts to escape or avoid painrelated stimuli can paradoxically serve to increase or maintain pain. For example, the 'fear of pain,' especially when combined with a coping strategy of avoidance, has been proposed as a critical factor in the etiology of chronic pain . Giving up the attempt to control largely uncontrollable private events may afford greater opportunities to engage in behavior directed at other, more accessible goals.
Acceptance is a promising new technique. Its effect is all the more surprising given that it teaches principles (e.g., "thoughts do not cause behavior") that run counter both to the popular culture and to many controlbased empirical clinical approaches. It seems important to begin to research precisely when each of these two approaches is most effective.
